

**Similar Surroundings: A Comparison of Anti-German Russia, and the  
Anti-German Environment of the United States During WWI and its  
Relation to the German-Russians.  
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**Introduction**

German-Russians are a pioneering people. They are ethnic Germans who pioneered both the steppes of western Russia and the North American Great Plains. They are a strong-willed people. With great fervency they resisted cultural assimilation. They are a betrayed people. Legal rights granted to them by both the manifestos of the Tsars and the Constitution of the United States were reneged. They are a persecuted people. In Russia horrible crimes have been perpetrated against them; in the U.S. they were vilified and subjected to hostility. They are a resilient people. They have conquered inhospitable land on multiple continents, and refused to relinquish both their language and culture.

German-Russian immigrants, surveying the flat Dakotan plains, must have been awestruck by how similar the surroundings were to the land they had so recently fled. The North American Great Plains were strikingly similar to their adopted homeland—the Russian steppes. There was, however, another similarity. The First World War fomented an anti-German environment in the U.S. similar to anti-German Russia. Anti-German activity in Russia constituted genocide; in the U.S. it was merely persecution and repression. This disparity doesn't disqualify the comparison. German-Russians fled Russia because their lawful rights were revoked, and merely 46 years after the first immigration to the U.S., some of these very same lawful rights were suspended.

In the states, German-Russians were only part of the larger German-American community; and, like the harsh environment of the plains, the anti-German environment did not solely target them. On the plains, familiarity gave them a considerable advantage in settling the inhospitable land. In dealing with language and cultural repression, they were at a disadvantage; the preservation of ethnic identity was immensely important to the German-Russians. This priority on preservation stems from their history in Russia.

**Ethnic Germans in Russia**

In 1763 Catherine the Great, the Tsarina of the Russian Empire, extended an invitation to attract ethnic Germans, like herself, to unpopulated yet economically violable areas of her empire. Her invitation was made by manifesto, a public declaration that guaranteed certain rights to those who accepted. Among the rights granted were those to: segregated communities, religious freedom, local autonomy of government, and exemption to compulsory military service. These rights were to be given in perpetuity to the descendents immigrants. In 1803 Tsar Alexander I, issued the same invitation. Thousands of Germans heeded the call and traveled first to the Volga and then the Black Sea regions.<sup>1</sup>

**Preservation of Ethnic Identity in Russia**

The German immigrants were able to retain their ethnic identity to a remarkable degree. Segregated colonies and local autonomy enabled insulation of traditional customs, dress, and music. Churches and schools were instrumental in preserving the various German-language dialects. Even though the rights that facilitated ethnic identity retention were later revoked, Germans stubbornly refused to assimilate.<sup>2</sup> Larissa Grams, a German-Russian

who grew up in Soviet Kazakhstan, “was allowed [as a child] only to speak German at home.” In this way they were able to keep the language of their forefathers alive for over 200 years. She, like many other German-Russians, immigrated to Germany in the post WWII years. Some of the old dialects were such a relic that other post-war immigrants found that they were not understandable to speakers of modern German.<sup>3</sup>

### **Discontent among Germans in Russia**

The year 1871 was a major turning point in German-Russian history. Tsar Alexander II began to take away rights granted under the manifestos and thereby reduced Germans to the peasantry class. Particularly galling was the Military Reform Act of 1874, which brought forced conscription. Further encroachments came in 1881 when Alexander III came to power. All rights to self-government were lost, and it became an offense to transact business in any language but Russian. In 1892 Russian became the obligatory language of the Empire; German wasn't allowed to be spoken. Discontent among Germans led many to seek escape.<sup>4</sup>

### **German-Russian Immigrants to the United States**

German-Russians first settled in the U.S. in 1872. Impetus to the immigration was provided by the revocation of rights granted under the manifestos. Heads of families were granted 160 acres in the Dakota Territory under the Homestead Act of 1862. Like their forefathers who pioneered the Russian steppes, the grant they received was considered to be liberal in size. There are further similarities. The Russian steppes, like the North American Great Plains, are flat, semiarid grasslands. They have similar weather patterns and soil type.<sup>5</sup> The Dakota Territory, where many of the German-Russians settled, is only slightly south in latitude of the Volga or Black Sea Regions. Both areas are considered breadbaskets, so it's not surprising that the German-Russians planted wheat as they had in the old country.<sup>6</sup> Their acclimation to the environment gave them considerable advantage over other plains settlers. More German-Russians soon followed and a wave of migration continued until about the beginning of World War I. By 1920 their population in the U.S. was approximately 116,500. German-Russians also settled in the Canadian plains and South America.<sup>7</sup>

### **Preservation of Ethnic Identity in the U.S.**

Not only did they settle in familiar surroundings, but they also endeavored to maintain traditional communities. This was made difficult by a stipulation in the Homestead Act that required homesteaders to reside on their farms. The village had been the predominant characteristic of life in Russia;<sup>8</sup> nonetheless, they continued to struggle against assimilation. Communities maintained close ties within themselves and relative isolation toward outsiders.<sup>9</sup> Here there lies a profound contrast with the larger German-American community. German immigrants in general readily embraced American society “through marriage, acceptance of English as a common language, and involvement in business and community life.” U.S. involvement in WWI caused ambivalence for German-Americans. They were devoted American citizens, but the war brought great hardships to their families in Europe, and some of the blame rested upon their American compatriots.<sup>10</sup>

## **German Persecution in Russia during WWI**

### *Under Nicholas II*

Life was difficult in Russia during the war. It was particularly hard for the peasantry class, and with the loss of special privileges some 40 years earlier this is what the Germans had become.<sup>11</sup> Peasants' sons, as well as their horses, were forced to join the Imperial Army. Grain prices plummeted compelling many to hoard. The economy slowed and goods became scarce.<sup>12</sup>

The war fostered xenophobia with a distinct bent toward Germans. Their loyalty was called into question.<sup>13</sup> The capital was renamed from the too German sounding St. Petersburg to Petrograd.<sup>14</sup> This was but one of the fears' more innocuous manifestations. In language reminiscent to the modern ear of Adolph Hitler, "Foreign Minister Zazonov called for a final solution to the ethnic German problem in Russia." Zazonov believed that the war had brought about favorable conditions to this end and advocated genocidal measures. His advice was followed; between 190,000 and 200,000 Germans were deported in the years 1915 and 1916.<sup>15</sup> They were sent to Siberia for "crimes against the state."<sup>16</sup> Pogroms, in which businesses and homes were destroyed, occurred in major Russian cities. The German-language was prohibited in newspapers, correspondence, and even public speech.<sup>17</sup> This was merely the first phase of Russian hostility toward Germans during World War I.

### *Under the Provisional and Bolshevik Governments*

Nicholas II's hold on the Russian Empire had become ever more tenuous throughout the war. Wartime measures had exacerbated long existing problems within the empire. Popular unrest was a lingering problem for the heavy-handed Tsars. Nicholas himself had survived a failed revolution in 1905. Succumbing to pressure, on 2 March 1917 Nicholas abdicated. The abdication ushered in a provisional government, but to little effect. Russia remained in the war, inflation went uncurbed, popular unrest was unabated, and the peasants continued to hoard grain.<sup>18</sup> The peasantry was in a volatile situation for conflict as starvation was rampant. On 25 October 1917, there was coup d'état.

The radical Bolsheviks seized power and an organized terror campaign ensued. Terror was not directed solely at the Germans; many classes were persecuted including the middle class, more affluent peasants known as kulaks, Tsarist loyalists, and others.<sup>19</sup> Again, the tactics utilized against the Germans easily constitute genocide: mass shootings, rape, torture, drownings, and the razing of entire villages.<sup>20</sup> Russia and Germany signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918.<sup>21</sup> This brought about the end of Russian participation in the Great War, but it didn't end hostility toward Germans. During the subsequent period known as the Russian Civil War—which lasted until 1921—lawlessness pervaded the massive nation.<sup>22</sup> Violence was rampant in the countryside as "robber bands raided [German and Russian] villages." In the few areas controlled by the Bolsheviks, Germans continued to undergo forced deportation to Siberia and Central Asia. Most Germans that remained in Russia after WWI were eventually forced to relocate during the Second World War, first to Germany prior to 22 June 1941—when war broke out between the Soviets and Germans—and then to Siberia and Central Asia.<sup>23</sup>

## **German Persecution in the United States during WWI**

### *The Neutrality Years and German Outrage*

By 1914 there were some 9 million German speakers in the U.S. and 15 million ethnic Germans, accounting for nearly one-quarter of the population. As mentioned, American-Germans had eagerly integrated into American culture. In the years before the war, however, there was one issue that sparked German hostility toward life in the States. It was felt that Prohibition was an affront to German culture. The beer hall remained an honored tradition in German life.<sup>24</sup> The Prohibition movement was equally unpopular with German-Russians as indicated by a poll conducted by the *Dakota Freie Presse*, a German-Russian newspaper, in 1919.<sup>25</sup> Prohibition had become the impetus to the formation of German interest groups. One such group, the National German-American Alliance, was some 2 million strong by 1914. It was well funded by German brewing companies and had procured close association with the German-language press. American-German outrage over events in WWI—which began in August 1914—would swell the membership of such groups. “Within eighteen months [of the beginning of 1914]...[the National Alliance] had added a third million” to its ranks.<sup>26</sup>

At the outset of the war America declared neutrality. Like other neutral nations, the U.S. exported to both members of the Alliance—Britain, France, and Russia—and the Central Powers—Germany and Austria-Hungary. This proved problematic. Within weeks of the inception of war, the British imposed a blockade of the Central Powers. The U.S., now blocked from making shipments to one side, complained of the infringement of their neutral rights. They, however, continued to ship to the Allies.<sup>27</sup> Germans eagerly pointed out the hypocrisy. An “Iowa Democrat [in congress] Henry Vollmer, a German American with close links to the [National] Alliance, accused his country of being ‘the arch-hypocrite among the nations of the earth, praying for peace...and furnishing the instruments of murder to one side only of a contest in which we pretend that all the contestants are our friends.’”<sup>28</sup>

In February 1915, Germany began its own blockade utilizing submarines as opposed to ships.<sup>29</sup> On 7 May 1915 the *Lusitania*, a British luxury ship, was torpedoed off of the coast of Ireland.<sup>30</sup> Onboard were 128 Americans along with thousands of cases of ammunition bound for Britain.<sup>31</sup> This event shocked many Americans out of their apathy toward the war. Equally shocking was the reaction of some German-Americans who placed the blame for the incident entirely on the British.<sup>32</sup> The U.S. came to the brink of war, but in September 1915 Germany announced that passenger ships would be given warning before such attacks. The belligerent spirit was quelled enough to avoid war, and the U.S. remained officially neutral.<sup>33</sup>

The following year, 1916, was a presidential election year in the U.S. While being of secondary importance to his campaign, Wilson touted his efforts to keep America out of the war.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, especially with regards to the war, 1916 is characterized by the inactivity typical of election years. After Wilson secured re-election things quickly progressed. On 31 January 1917, Germany declared a resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. This, along with a supposed note from the German foreign minister to Mexico urging the Mexicans to take action on the side of Germany against the U.S., encouraged the U.S. to declare war on 2 April 1917.<sup>35</sup>

### *Paranoia and Propaganda*

Apathy and ambivalence were pervasive during initial American involvement in the war. The indifference of the neutrality years didn't

disappear overnight; nor did the divided loyalties of those who traced their lineage to the Central Powers. Nations can't make war with such variegated motivation. To inspire the nation to fight, the U.S. government began to produce propaganda. Films like *The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin* and publications like *Why America Fights Germany* exaggerated war atrocities and purveyed a faulty impression that the German military had ambitions of occupying the continental U.S. It's not surprising then that the vilification of Germans created an environment hostile to German-Americans.<sup>36</sup>

A period of mass paranoia swept the country soon after its entry into the war. Disloyal Germans were rumored to have put ground glass into food and poison on Red Cross bandages. William Randolph Hearst, one hardly averse to a sensational milieu, reported that flashes of light on his apartment windows in New York were signals to German submarines in the Hudson River.<sup>37</sup> The same logic landed the young playwright Eugene O'Neil in jail. While using his typewriter on a beach in Massachusetts, the light reflecting off of the machine was mistaken to be a signal to German ships.<sup>38</sup>

In cities across the country violence broke out as mobs attacked German businesses and homes. Humiliated Germans were brought in front of crowds and compelled to make patriotic displays of loyalty, like kissing the American Flag. Impunity was the norm as authorities and juries, not wanting their own fealty called to question, took little action against perpetrators. German culture was also attacked. The New York Times refused to acknowledge any books from German Publication and German-language curriculum was banned in many schools.<sup>39</sup> This paranoia would couple with a desire to quash criticism of the war.

#### *The Espionage and Sedition Acts*

Well before the declaration of war the administration had sought to silence critics of its war policies. In the aftermath of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, Wilson made the following speech to congress:

There are citizens of the United States born under other flags but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life...[It is] necessary that we should promptly make use of processes of law by which we may be purged of their corrupt distempers...I urge you to enact such laws at the earliest possible moment...Such creatures of passion, disloyalty and anarchy must be crushed out.<sup>40</sup>

Wilson spoke for many Americans, but the powers he was asking for were unprecedented. The passage of such extraordinary legislation required the presence of extraordinary conditions. Real national peril was nonexistent in the summer of 1915. A few Americans had died aboard a British ship thousands of miles from the U.S.<sup>41</sup> In fact, sufficient danger really never became manifest—even after the U.S. had decided to enter the fray. However unmerited, in an America imbued with the propaganda and paranoia of 1917 and 1918, times indeed appeared extraordinary.<sup>42</sup>

In June 1917 the Espionage Act would become law. "During the neutrality years and on into the first months of the war, pessimistic rumors, criticism of America's military preparations, and overtly pro-German propaganda had all gone unchecked."<sup>43</sup> It now became unlawful to make "statements that might interfere with the success of the armed forces, insight disloyalty, or obstruct

recruiting to the Army.” Also, the postmaster general was given power to prohibit all such material from being carried through the mail.<sup>44</sup>

Nearly one year later, on 16 May 1918, Wilson signed the Sedition Act. Meant as an addendum to the Espionage Act, obstruction of the draft, opposition to the Liberty Loan scheme, and calling for Marxist revolution were added to the list of punishable offenses.<sup>45</sup> A society of informants was fostered as citizens watched their neighbors and even their own family for signs of disloyalty. Quasi-vigilante groups were formed. The Minute Men, in the state of Washington, sent spies into German language classes to listen for subversive teaching. Similar groups like “the Boy Spies of America, the Terrible Threateners, the Knights of Liberty, the Sedition Slammers, and the Anti-Yellow Dog League” informed on friends, family, and acquaintances. Local courts were flooded with cases under the Espionage and Sedition Acts, as was the Justice Department with letters of denouncement.<sup>46</sup> One such case was that of the German-American F.W. Sallet and his German-Russian newspaper the *Dakota Freie Presse*.

#### *F.W. Sallet and the Dakota Freie Presse*

The *Dakota Freie Presse* (DFP) was a German-language publication founded in Yankton, South Dakota in 1874. By WWI it was an immensely influential and important German-Russian newspaper. In its early years, however, the paper wasn’t specifically German-Russian and only began to take on a distinctly German-Russian bent about 1885. Around that time the DFP was purchased by a German-Russian named Johan Christian Wenzlaff. In the following years, the paper would take on great importance in preserving the ethnic identity of the German-Russians in America. Reports from the paper not only facilitated, but were often the impetus for, emigration from Russia. From its inception to 1903 it went through quite a few owners and editors; some held tenure for little over a year and some for over a decade. The paper still managed to build a circulation of about 3,400, mainly in South Dakota, and had correspondents in many villages in Russia.<sup>47</sup>

Another ownership change occurred in 1903. This one would prove monumental. Friedrich Wilhelm Sallet took the reigns of the DFP and immediately set out on a tour of South Dakota to gain understanding of his readers. Subscribers stressed the importance of the paper in preserving culture and language. It’s not surprising that German-Russians would place priority on the retention of ethnic identity. They were new immigrants to the U.S. who had absorbed this ethos from their forefathers. At this time it was a paper of predominately local flavor with circulation among the German-Russians of South Dakota. Sallet would procure an international following among the German-Russian diaspora.<sup>48</sup>

F. W. Sallet, however, wasn’t a German-Russian; he was from the East Prussian region of Germany. He had owned and edited newspapers in both Germany and the U.S. Sallet appeared to be just another short-time owner when he abruptly sold the paper and resigned editorship in 1906. After a two-year hiatus, attributed to personal problems, he returned in 1908 to reassert that his goals were still those of language and culture preservation. In 1910 he founded another paper—the *Neue Deutsche Presse* (NDP). He continued to be the force behind the DFP, adding correspondents in new German-Russian settlements in the U.S. and Canada.<sup>49</sup>

Sallet took pains to make the DFP an integral part of the German-Russian community. The DFP carried a column for those soliciting information about

family and friends with who contact had been lost. Schedules for traveling doctors in the Midwest were printed.

The Great War brought new concerns to the community. Many German-Russians had been conscripted into the Russian Imperial Army and had been taken as prisoners of war by Germany. Beginning in 1915, Sallet ran a correspondence program between the POWs and their loved ones in the states.<sup>50</sup> "Their letters were often published in the paper."<sup>51</sup>

He was also concerned with issues purely German in nature. He supported a petition to President Wilson asking that the U.S. cease shipping arms to the allies and collected charity money for a German relief organization. The latter two activities flagged him as a German sympathizer. "As a result...it appears, both his house and business in Aberdeen [South Dakota] were broken into and plundered by local authorities".<sup>52</sup> Another consequence may have been greater scrutiny placed on his papers for infringements of the newly past Espionage Act.

The Espionage Act had been passed in June 1918. Supplemental legislation in October 1917 targeted the foreign-language press. "It provided that exact translations of all matters relating to the war had to be submitted to the local postmaster until such time as the government was sufficiently convinced of the loyalty of the foreign-language paper to issue a permit exempting it henceforth from the cumbersome and expensive process of filing translations."<sup>53</sup> The foreign-language press was highly dependent on the mail service for distribution. Failure to comply with the law could mean suspended delivery of an issue. "Under postal regulations, if a journal missed one issue, for whatever reason, it automatically lost its second-class mailing privilege—and for a great many publications, this spelled financial death".<sup>54</sup>

On 22 January 1918 Sallet announced in the DFP that both he and his editor, J. F. Paul Gross, had been charged with violation of the new legislation. In fact both had been arrested, Sallet for failing to file two translations for the NDP with the post office<sup>55</sup> and "Gross for having worn a ring with a traitorous inscription on it and a watchband that bore an image of Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm and Austria's Franz Josef".<sup>56</sup> Contrary to a report in the *Aberdeen Daily American* (ADA) there was nothing sinister in the two articles that had not been translated and filed. The ADA had apparently caught the propaganda and paranoia bug as it reported that the two articles in question had disloyal undertones. Sallet and Gross, both pleading innocent, were released on bail and awaited trial in May.<sup>57</sup>

Three events occurred before the trial. First, Sallet decided to discontinue the NDP. The scandal had merely added to a following that was already in decline. The remaining subscribers would receive the DFP instead. Secondly, "the courtroom [would be] highly charged because the Senate had just passed the infamous Sedition Bill by a" narrow vote. The passage of this second act of repressive power had both promoted hysteria and outrage. Thirdly, J. F. Paul Gross wouldn't stand trial as planned with Sallet. He had been interned as an enemy alien for the duration of the war. Gross thought that he had gained citizenship through the naturalization of his father. He must have been shocked to learn that he was too old at the time of his father's naturalization and, therefore, had never actually become a legal citizen. Sallet would change his plea from innocent to guilty.<sup>58</sup>

At the trial, Sallet acknowledged that he, the publisher, bore final responsibility for the failure to file translation. He also asserted that he had always endeavored to follow the laws of the U.S., while his attorney eagerly pointed out the arbitrariness of the indictment. One of the articles in question

had been taken directly from another German-language publication. Neither this paper nor, as Sallet alleged, nearly every other German-language paper in the country, had filed a translation for this particular article. No other editors or publishers were charged for use of the story. The judge was sympathetic to Sallet's plea and gave him the minimum \$500 punishment. For Sallet, however, this was in addition to \$6,000 in legal fees and \$6,000 in the purchase of liberty loans as a means of proving his loyalty.<sup>59</sup>

The trial nearly ruined him. Along with the loss of the NDP and the large financial burden, many readers of the DFP, afraid of guilt by association, had cancelled subscriptions. Sallet carried on. He sold his publishing and printing establishment to pay debt. Freed to focus on editorial duties, Sallet and the DFP survived.<sup>60</sup> When the war came to an end in 1919 the DFP ran a relief program for children in Germany and once again reaffirmed its importance to the German-Russian community.<sup>61</sup> "It was the first paper published in the U.S. to gain re-entry into the U.S.S.R. in 1924"<sup>62</sup> and didn't cease publication until 1954.<sup>63</sup>

### **Conclusion**

Like F.W. Sallet and the *Dakota Freie Presse* the German-Russians overcame adversity and persisted. In the U.S. they subdued the land and, with the aid of the DFP, retained their identity. In Russia the villages had been their bulwark against assimilation. In many ways the DFP became their village; it was their basis for maintaining language and tradition. This is why the oppression of language and tradition encompassed in the attack on the DFP had to have been particularly painful for many German-Russians. The very reason that they were in the U.S. was that their legal rights, granted by the manifestos, had been taken away. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to...petition the Government for redress of grievances".<sup>64</sup> During WWI congress passed such laws.

The justification was that the peril of the times merited an extraordinary and even unconstitutional response. The peril was, however, a fallacy—born of the states desire to motivate. The propaganda produced to inspire the country to fight also created an environment hostile to personal property and personal liberty. A primary purpose of the American government is to protect property and liberty. It's astonishing that the state not only failed in its fundamental duty to protect, but it was directly responsible for the creation of an environment hostile to these very things.

How does this compare to Russia during WWI? Under both the last Tsar and the Bolsheviks, discrimination or genocidal barbarity was meted out against Germans. In the U.S., mobs inspired by government propaganda attacked German homes and businesses. In both nations, the state itself was culpable. In both nations, authorities and citizens were inspired to persecute by government-fostered xenophobia. In basic terms, the only difference is severity. The similarity is regrettable.

Americans should look on the plight of Germans and German-Russians during WWI with flushed cheeks. They should be embarrassed of the nation that holds its Constitution and Bill of Rights as a model for the rest of the world, but failed to honor those documents. They should be embarrassed of the nation that proclaims the virtue of respect for personal liberty, but created a milieu antithetical to it. Tracing the history of the Germans from Russia yields two valuable lessons. One is that the rights granted under the U.S. Constitution and the Bills of Rights are sacrosanct. They should be



strictly interpreted and under no circumstance should they be consciously abridged. Two is that sincerity and honesty are paramount in motivating the nation. Americans would do well to remember these lessons and thereby avoid like comparisons. Those who come to America with the purpose of escaping repressive regimes should not find themselves in similar surroundings.

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<sup>1</sup> (Miller, M. (2009) a., --- (2008) b.)

<sup>2</sup> (Miller, M. (2009) a., --- (2008) b.)

<sup>3</sup> (Schmemmann, S. (1997))

<sup>4</sup> (Miller, M. (2009) a., --- (2008) b.)

<sup>5</sup> (Miller, M. (2009) a., --- (2008) b.)

<sup>6</sup> (Service, R. (2003) p. 79)

<sup>7</sup> (Miller, M. (2009) a.)

<sup>8</sup> (Miller, M. (2009) a.)

<sup>9</sup> (Rippley, L. (2009) par. 5)

<sup>10</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 32)

<sup>11</sup> (Miller, M. (2009) a., --- (2008) b.)

<sup>12</sup> (Service, R. (2003) p. 31)

<sup>13</sup> (Sinner, S. (2005))

<sup>14</sup> (Service, R. (2003) p. 27)

<sup>15</sup> (Sinner, S. (2005))

<sup>16</sup> (Miller, M. (2009) a.).

<sup>17</sup> (Sinner, S. (2005))

<sup>18</sup> (Service, R. (2003) pp. 45-61)

<sup>19</sup> (Service, R. (2003) pp. 81-122)

<sup>20</sup> (Sinner, S. (2005))

<sup>21</sup> (Service, R. (2003) p. 78)

<sup>22</sup> (Service, R. (2003) pp. 101-122)

<sup>23</sup> (Miller, M. (2009) a.)

<sup>24</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 32)

<sup>25</sup> (Rippley, L. (2009) par. 25)

<sup>26</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 32)

<sup>27</sup> (Henretta, J.; Brownlee, W.; Brody, D.; Ware, S.; & Johnson, M. (1997) p.

712)

<sup>28</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 33)

<sup>29</sup> (Henretta, J.; et al (1997) p. 712)

<sup>30</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 37, Henretta, J.; et al (1997) p. 712)

<sup>31</sup> (Henretta, J.; et al (1997) p. 712)

<sup>32</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) pp. 38-39)

<sup>33</sup> (Henretta, J.; et al (1997) pp. 712-713)

<sup>34</sup> (Henretta, J.; et al (1997) p. 713)

<sup>35</sup> (Henretta, J.; et al (1997) pp. 713-714)

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- <sup>36</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 294)  
<sup>37</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) pp. 295-297)  
<sup>38</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 307)  
<sup>39</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) pp. 295-297)  
<sup>40</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 39)  
<sup>41</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 39)  
<sup>42</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 167)  
<sup>43</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 167)  
<sup>44</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 167)  
<sup>45</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 302)  
<sup>46</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 307)  
<sup>47</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) pars. 5-8, 11-12)  
<sup>48</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) pars. 8, 11, 18)  
<sup>49</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) pars. 9, 13-14, 20-21, 24, 26)  
<sup>50</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) pars. 25, 28-29)  
<sup>51</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) par. 25)  
<sup>52</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) par. 31)  
<sup>53</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) par. 32)  
<sup>54</sup> (Harries, M.; Harries, S. (1997) p. 167)  
<sup>55</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) pars. 36-37)  
<sup>56</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) par. 36)  
<sup>57</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) pars. 38-40)  
<sup>58</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) pars. 41-43)  
<sup>59</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) pars. 44, 47-48)  
<sup>60</sup> (p 49-51)  
<sup>61</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) pars. 49-51, 53-55)  
<sup>62</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) par. 55)  
<sup>63</sup> (Ripley, L. (2009) par. 1)  
<sup>64</sup> (Henretta, J.; et al (1997) p. D-12)